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Ethical Engagements Over Time
Reading and Rereading  
David Copperfield and Wuthering Heights
In chapters 7 and 8, respectively, I have shown how up-close and detailed 
ethical criticism can yield both positive and negative judgments. In 
this chapter I show how up-close and detailed ethical analysis can yield 
mixed judgments based on an account of how an auditor’s perceptions 
of an artwork can change over time. The contents of this chapter also 
develop the thread of argument introduced in previous chapters, namely, 
that issues raised by ethical criticism are often profoundly personal. In 
this chapter I demonstrate that the personal influence stories sometimes 
exert on ethos is not limited to whatever effects end when the story ends, 
but are sometimes effects that change every time the story is revisited. 
Given that the development of an ethos is organic, not mechanistic, it 
may be the case that while a given story can exert a persistent influence 
on us, it may not always exert the same influence, especially over long 
periods of time. 
How each of us learns from narratives that we encounter many times 
over many years is a complicated process, one worthy of its own narra-
tive. In what follows, I will explore as case studies my ongoing ethical en-
gagement with two narratives, Charles Dickens’s David Copperfield and 
Emily Brontë’s Wuthering Heights. My claim is not that all readers will or 
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should respond to these stories as I have done, but that my experience 
offers one version of a more general phenomenon with stories that I be-
lieve other story lovers will recognize. One’s ongoing interactions with a 
given story are certainly not a once-and-for-all thing like a brass casting.1 
Ongoing interactions with any narrative may mean that an auditor is, at 
one point in time, especially open to the story’s ethical vision, but that at 
other points in time he or she may be especially susceptible to misread-
ing that vision or seeing it through a glass darkly. My story illustrates 
several facets of this general phenomenon, and more.
Ethical Vision in David Copperfield and Its Usefulness to Me
Many of Dickens’s most passionate readers first discovered him when 
they were children, but I did not. My personal relationship with David 
Copperfield began when I discovered Dickens’s novels as a twenty-four-
year-old graduate student at the University of Chicago. In a bright Chi-
cago autumn in a class taught by the great scholar Morton Dauwen 
Zabel, I discovered the banquet table of Dickens’s novels, and I devoured 
one after another as rapidly as I could. I strode around my tiny married-
student apartment reading to the walls the speeches from different char-
acters, laughing my head off at Vincent Crummles’s story of the circus 
pony in Nicholas Nickleby, whose mother, says Crummles, “ate apple-pie 
at a circus for upwards of fourteen years, and went to bed in a nightcap; 
and, in short, took the low comedy entirely” (286); was brought nearly 
to tears in Little Dorrit over the sadness of Arthur Clennam’s childhood, 
which Clennam remembers as “a legion of Sundays, all days of unser-
viceable bitterness and mortification, slowly passing before him” (30); or 
raged bitterly with Dickens against the callous neglect of the poor as the 
narrator of Bleak House responds to Jo’s death with his thunderous de-
nunciation, “Dead, your Majesty. Dead, my lords and gentlemen. Dead, 
Right Reverends and Wrong Reverends of every order. Dead, men and 
women, born with Heavenly compassion in your hearts. And dying thus 
around us every day” (649).
I can just hear the disapproval of some of my readers. “Laughter 
and tears? How gauche! How naïve! How unprofessional!” Yes, these re-
sponses are all gauche, naïve, and unprofessional. I plead guilty on all 
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counts. But I also remain unrepentant on all counts. My responses were 
naïve and unprofessional because they were not responses I cooked up 
for the sake of looking good in Zabel’s class or for the sake of teaching 
my own Dickens classes later. (As for having responses that I might later 
publish in a book, I would at that time have considered this possibility no 
more likely than writing the Great American Novel on the back of a nap-
kin.) My responses, naïve and raw, came directly from the heart of Dick-
ens’s ethical visions to my own heart, which was intensely hungry for an 
ethical vision of life more generous, compassionate, humane, thoughtful, 
connected, and nourishing than the ethical vision of Protestant funda-
mentalism and parental meanness foisted on me in my childhood.
Since my discovery of Dickens’s novels during that bright autumn 
of my graduate school years, the components of Dickens’s ethical vision 
have woven themselves like living threads into the warp and woof of my 
life. They form an active part of my personal history. The Dickens novel 
that has had the greatest effect on me is David Copperfield, at the heart of 
which lies an ethical vision of nurturing versus destructive relations be-
tween children and adults: an ethical vision of how some kinds of child/
adult relations create the foundations for human flourishing, and how 
other kinds of child/adult relations create weakness, self-absorption, 
self-loathing, and stymied development.
When I first read David Copperfield, I especially vibrated in sympa-
thy to the way the history of my own young life mirrored the history of 
Davy’s young life, primarily because my own father shared many features 
of character with Mr. Murdstone. My own Murdstone father was my bio-
logical father, not my stepfather. Like Mr. Murdstone, he was egotistical, 
tyrannical, and rigid and had a short fuse that could explode into sudden 
violence, mostly directed at me and nearly always delivered behind the 
mask of self-righteous, pious, Murdstonean ideologies like “spare the rod 
and spoil the child,” and “discipline is good for the soul,” and (the most 
infuriating piety of all) “this hurts me worse than it hurts you.”2 David 
Copperfield’s description of the character assumed by both his new step-
father and his odious sister, Miss Murdstone, also fits my own father:
Firmness, I may observe, was the grand quality on which both 
Mrs. and Miss Murdstone took their stand. However I might have 
expressed my comprehension of it at that time, if I had been called 
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upon, I nevertheless did clearly comprehend in my own way, that it 
was another name for tyranny; and for a certain gloomy, arrogant, 
devil’s humor, that was in them both. The creed . . . was this. Mr. 
Murdstone was firm; nobody in his world was to be as firm as Mr. 
Murdstone; nobody else in his world was to be firm at all, for every-
body was to be bent to his firmness. (49)
It was also that case that my own mother, like Davy’s, was fearful, 
weak, easily dominated, and weepily ineffectual—a world-class expert 
at living in withdrawal and denial—and thus offered me no protection 
from my Murdstone father. At the age of twenty-four, when I first read 
David Copperfield, I had not processed—indeed, I was still at that time 
unable even to see—the bruising dynamics of having been raised in a 
family of highlight-reel dysfunctionality, but you can imagine how sym-
pathetically I responded to Davy’s childhood sufferings. I never bit the 
hand that caned me, but even though I was in my twenties when I first 
encountered this scene in David Copperfield, I received a major jolt of 
vicarious pleasure in the payback.
The value of such vicarious experience, however, surely lies not in 
the enjoyment of petty paybacks. If the value of reading about Davy bit-
ing Murdstone were merely vicarious payback, I’m sure that I would have 
soon outgrown the novel. The value of this narrative experience for me, 
and, presumably, for others, lies not in its cementing of petty emotions, 
but in its ethical invitation to deepen my understanding of both my past 
and my present, and thus to acquire a different ethos from the person 
I would have been as merely the victim of that past. Even at the unre-
flective age of twenty-four, I could see more clearly in Davy’s life than 
I could see in my own life certain consequences of having been raised 
under tyranny, namely, the way a tyrannized child tends to respond both 
too uncritically and too eagerly for his own good to any crumb of sup-
port and sympathy from an outside source, as Davy responds too eagerly 
and loyally to Steerforth’s careless and manly but elegant attentions.3 I 
could see in Davy’s case that the no-nonsense support of Betsy Trot-
wood, who expected reciprocal support from Davy, modeled for Davy a 
more mature ethos than he would have had if he had received the kind of 
compensation for childhood suffering that every suffering child wants: 
unlimited sympathy.
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But I could only see these things, of course, because they were there 
to be seen, because they form part of the ethical vision of Dickens’s novel. 
Seeing the history of David Copperfield’s relationship to Mr. Murdstone 
helped me place my relationship with my own father before me as an 
object to be apprehended and thought about, not just felt. I don’t want 
to overstate the case and say that the scales fell from my eyes on my first 
reading, but the novel affected me deeply, and in so doing it prepared me 
to see more objectively my relationship with my own father.
Claiming that this story helped me see things more clearly contra-
dicts Plato’s claim that imitations only confuse our hearts and muddle 
our thinking, but Plato is so often right in this claim that contradict-
ing him requires taking a moment for explanation. It won’t do to dis-
miss Plato as if his claim were always and on principle wrong. Plato sees 
clearly that many imitations—stories, to us—do indeed invite us to think 
shallowly, self-interestedly, and unclearly about life. Who would argue 
that Broadway musicals, Disney movies, pornography, and most TV 
soap operas and sitcoms help us see life whole and see it more clearly? 
Plato was dead right—even though he didn’t have All My Children or 
 Andrew Lloyd Webber musicals or The Little Mermaid to point to—
when he claimed that a lot of narratives pander to fantasy (in the worst 
sense of losing ourselves in ego wish fulfillment), pride, ambition, and 
unearned fulfillments. Where Plato loses the best thrust of his argument 
is in its overextension, his assumption that there are no distinctions to be 
made between the clarifying representations of Homer and Sophocles, 
on the one hand, and the poetry of mindless repetition he hated from 
the rhapsodists. Dickens helped me see my own life more clearly not by 
pandering to my self-pity but by showing me how Davy’s defects of char-
acter are not solely rooted in Mr. Murdstone’s abuse, but also grow from 
Davy’s maudlin self-pity, his sentimental emotionalism, and his exces-
sive trust in self-styled authority figures. David Copperfield did not pan-
der to my own excesses; it challenged them, and it helped me see them 
more clearly, thus helping me establish an ethos of greater maturity and 
generosity than I would have been able to establish without its guiding 
models and informative presence.
A relevant distinction here (and an additional point) is a distinc-
tion between ethical models that we might wish to emulate and ethical 
models that assist or enrich our understanding. Davy’s biting attack on 
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Murdstone decidedly did not give me a useful model to emulate. This 
episode did not make me wish to bite my father’s hand, and biting it 
would not have solved anything anyway. Reading that scene did, how-
ever, prepare me to understand better some of my childish resentments 
and also my childish tendency, even in young adulthood, to unwittingly 
exaggerate the extent of my father’s power and authority over both me 
and others.
Two other passages generated by this novel’s ethical vision have car-
ried great weight for me, both when I first read David Copperfield and 
throughout my many years of rereading it. My relationship to these two 
passages has been changing and variable, more like the dynamic rela-
tionship one has with a lifelong friend than the static relationship one 
has with a toaster or an automobile (see Booth, “The Way I Loved” and 
Company). The passage early on in which young Davy portrays himself 
in his tiny attic bedroom, reading and rereading the delightful cache of 
novels that he has discovered there as a kind of secret legacy from his 
dead father struck me with great force because it so mirrored my own 
youthful reading. In the chapter called “I Fall into Disgrace,” a condition 
into which both Davy and I were frequently cast by our father figures—a 
condition which goes far to explain why we both spent much solitary 
time in our rooms reading—Davy describes himself in the following 
passage, which I have considerably shortened:
My father had left a small collection of books in a little room upstairs, 
to which I had access. . . . From that blessed little room, Roderick 
Random, Peregrine Pickle, Humphrey Clinker, Tom Jones, the Vicar 
of Wakefield, Don Quixote, Gil Blas, and Robinson Crusoe, came out, a 
glorious host, to keep me company. . . . It is curious to me how I could 
ever have consoled myself under my small troubles (which were great 
troubles to me), by impersonating my favorite characters in them—as I 
did. . . . I have been Tom Jones . . . for a week together. I have sustained 
my own idea of Roderick Random for a month at a stretch, I verily 
believe . . . and for days and days I can remember to have gone about 
my region of our house, armed with the centerpiece out of an old set of 
boot-trees—the perfect realization of Captain Somebody, of the Royal 
British Navy, in danger of being beset by savages, and resolved to sell 
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his life at a great price. . . . When I think of it, the picture always rises in 
my mind of a summer evening, the boys at play in the churchyard, and 
I sitting on my bed, reading as if for life. (55–56; emphasis added)
I, too, as a boy, spent a good deal of time roaming the areas where 
my family lived, usually rural areas, pretending I was a character from 
one of my latest-read novels. But the significance of the “reading as if 
for life” passage has not meant the same thing to me over the years. At 
the time I first read it, I had not yet dealt with the painful truths of my 
upbringing, but the image of young Davy escaping from family troubles 
and trying to avoid further disgrace by retreating into a world of imagi-
nation and readerly experiences elicited responses from me that were 
warm and sympathetic, although fairly mushy and muddled. My reaction 
was partly formed, I believe now, out of unacknowledged self-pity and a 
sense of kinship with any young child to whom reading was not only the 
means of escaping a forbidding and frightening father but indulging in a 
private pleasure beyond anyone else’s dismissal or contempt.
Now, however, many years later, this “reading as if for life” passage 
is still important to me, but in a quite different way. Instead of evoking 
a vague dissatisfaction with my lot and awakening in me a childish self-
pity about my abusive upbringing, it evokes for me the satisfying realiza-
tion that my youthful reading, no matter what unhappy pressures may 
have been partly responsible for it, ultimately yielded more benefits and 
advantages for me than almost anything else I have ever done, second 
only in importance and benefits to the wife and daughters who grace my 
life. I can look back now on “reading as if for life” and think, “Yes, I did 
read not merely as if for life but in a way that has made reading a way of 
life in itself. I have kept on reading for life and can’t imagine another or 
a better one.”
The second passage that has greatly assisted me over the years in 
my pursuit of a stable personal identity (Eldridge, Eakin, Ricoeur) is the 
opening sentence of David Copperfield: “Whether I shall turn out to be 
the hero of my own life, or whether that station will be held by anybody 
else, these pages must show” (1). This sentence has been a touchstone 
for me in times of confusion and uncertainty, helping me return to a 
clearer and more purposeful sense of myself. It has played this role in 
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my life because it plays this role in the ethical vision of the novel, which 
is nothing if not an ethical vision of how David Copperfield becomes an 
independent and self-knowledgeable ethical agent instead of the fright-
ened lump of self-pitying weakness that he was programmed to be.
But children such as Davy Copperfield and I don’t easily discover 
or travel the path to independent agency. For many years “whether I 
shall turn out to be the hero of my own life” nearly haunted me. I knew 
intuitively that it did not refer merely to masculine daring—firing the 
torpedoes, winning the game, or saving the child—but instead to some-
thing more like internal integrity, self-direction, and self-knowledge. I 
knew that being the hero of my own life meant believing that I could be-
come something like a “best version” of myself despite not having been 
 properly nourished and supported as a child. But I also knew intuitively, 
and this intuition troubled me greatly, that I could not be the hero of my 
own life unless I broke free from the emotional insecurities of having 
been a child who was forever and forever “falling into disgrace.”
One of the many dangers of being an unloved and powerless child is 
that such children tend to resist rather than embrace personal agency and 
personal responsibility. Unloved children too often become adults who 
never see failures as their own fault, but as the fault of those who should 
have cared for them more and loved them better. Unloved and powerless 
children have great trouble embracing the truth that being unloved does not 
let them off the hook for being responsible agents in the world. They tend to 
think at the very least that the trade-off for suffering ought to be not being 
held responsible. They never say this to themselves explicitly, but it is a 
perspective on themselves that they find easy to maintain. I wanted agency 
for the obvious reason that autonomy is a superior mode of life compared 
to slavery, but I also resisted it because it meant not only that I would have 
to become responsible for my own life, but that I would have to give up 
nursing my childish angers and resentments. For many children these an-
gers and resentments can become lifelong habits of their adult hearts.
M. M. Bakhtin’s analysis of novelistic discourse offers a useful model 
for the kind of ongoing relationship with a novel that I am describing here. 
Bakhtin’s conception of the dialogic relationship among multiple voices 
within novels invites an analogy to the dialogic relationship that can de-
velop between novels and their readers over time. In Bakhtin’s words, 
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The way in which the word conceptualizes its object is a complex 
act . . . and into this complex play of light and shadow the word 
enters. . . . If we imagine the intention of such a word, that is, its 
directionality toward the object, in the form of a ray of light, then 
the living and unrepeatable play of colors and light on the facets of 
the image that it constructs can be explained as the spectral disper-
sion of the ray-word . . . in an atmosphere filled with the alien words, 
value judgments and accents through which the ray passes on its way 
toward the object; the social atmosphere of the word, the atmosphere 
that surrounds the object, makes the facets of the image sparkle. (277; 
emphasis in original)
Adapting this image so that the object becomes the reader and the word 
becomes the novel—but preserving Bakhtin’s insight into the nature of 
dialogic interaction—captures the sense of my own historical relation-
ship with the ethical vision of David Copperfield. This work, this novel-
as-word, entered my life like a ray and established a dynamic relationship 
with something alien to it, something not itself—that is, my conscious-
ness and the facts and conditions of my life—such that I, as the object 
of the word, came under the influence not of a passive word but of an 
interactive discourse, what Bakhtin has just called “the spectral disper-
sion of the ray-word.” Dickens’s ethical vision of what it might mean to 
“become the hero of my own life” threw light on my ambition, my deep 
impulse, to liberate myself from Murdstone-like oppression. Along with 
other influences, the light of ethical vision in David Copperfield–as-word 
helped me see the possibilities of my own life in a new way and, in help-
ing me see it, helped midwife my emergence into maturity. Stories are 
often a kind of midwife to character, but unlike physical children who 
get born only once, character is always being born, shaped out of the on-
going choices we make. As an ongoing thing of emergence, then, rather 
than a one-time fixed thing, character is susceptible to enduring di- 
alogical relationships with a great many influences, including stories, as 
David Copperfield has been to me.
For me the relationship with my father acted as a lens that fo-
cuses sharply on certain representations in David Copperfield—namely 
Davy’s relationship with Murdstone—but it is easy to imagine that other 
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readers—women, for example—might have typical experiences of fe-
males in a patriarchal society that invite them to focus not on Dickens’s 
depth of psychological insight into Murdstone’s pathologies, but on his 
shallowness of psychological insight into the possibilities for female ful-
fillment. I can imagine that many if not most women could not be happy 
having to choose between the clichéd silliness of Dora Spenlow or the 
clichéd saintliness of Agnes Wakefield.
Limitations of Ethical Vision in Wuthering Heights
In contrast to the instant bond I felt with the ethical vision of Dickens’s 
novels, I have had an up-and-down relationship with the ethical vision 
at the heart of Wuthering Heights, and it is precisely this history of up-
and-down interactions that makes an account of my relations with this 
story useful to the present discussion. Here I focus primarily on who I 
was when I first read Wuthering Heights and who I was when I engaged 
in subsequent rereadings of this novel at different points in time, and 
how the differences in who I was at each point in time both influenced 
my reading and was influenced by my reading.
• I first read Wuthering Heights when I was in high school, deeply 
steeped in all of my family’s dysfunctional turbulence.
• The second time I read Wuthering Heights I was in college, where 
my budding intellectual development and my distance from home 
allowed me to read the novel less pressured by family dynamics.
• The third time I read Wuthering Heights I was in graduate school, 
where my reading was driven primarily by growing skills of technical 
analysis, especially narrative technique, and this change in reading 
technique led me to a total reevaluation of the novel’s ethical vision.4
• The fourth time I read Wuthering Heights was in the spring of 2004, 
thirty-five years after graduate school, as part of my preparation for 
writing this chapter.
Only my last and most recent rereading of Wuthering Heights occurred at 
a far distant time and in a vastly different psychic space from all entangle-
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ments with my family’s dysfunctionality. My first painful confrontations 
with this dysfunctionality had occurred when I was thirty, which was 
also my age when I finished my doctorate, when I had finished the first 
three years of my professional career, and when I had just experienced the 
thrill of my first daughter’s birth, the catalytic event that led me, finally, 
to face my family’s sad pathologies. Each planetary tilt of my responses to 
Wuthering Heights has been produced by an interactive dynamic between 
the gravitational pull of the novel’s ethical vision and my own ethical 
quest for autonomy and self-knowledge as I orbited around it.
It speaks to the educational power of story in general to say that, in 
my view, the greatest contribution to this quest was made by story, not 
by desire. In the first place, to describe myself as engaged in a “quest 
for autonomy and self-knowledge” is not something I could have said 
before reading David Copperfield and Wuthering Heights. Reading these 
novels did not do all of the work for me, but they positioned me closer 
to this kind of self-awareness than if I had never read them at all. In the 
second place, while it would not be smart to underestimate the motiva-
tional power of human desire, the truth is that desire by itself, no matter 
how intense, doesn’t necessarily produce progress or generate light. In 
order to grow toward autonomy and self-knowledge I needed more than 
desire. I needed ideas, concepts, images, and models to work with—in 
short, I needed food for thought—and this I found in abundance in the 
novels I was reading. 
My High School Reading of Wuthering Heights:  
Heathcliff and the Ethic of Power
In my powerlessness and lack of agency in high school, at age fifteen, 
what most attracted me about the ethical vision of Wuthering Heights 
was Heathcliff ’s power, or, more precisely, his rise to power from an early 
position of abuse and deprivation. Heathcliff in his youth was precisely 
all the things that I was in my youth at the time I first encountered him in 
the pages of Brontë’s novel. He was psychologically battered and physi-
cally beaten, unappreciated, and treated unfairly, with no one to turn to 
for redress (after the death of old Mr. Earnshaw). After Heathcliff left 
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Wuthering Heights and returned to it a few years later as a man, how-
ever, he showed that he had become all the things that I was not and 
that, in truth, I could not at that time even imagine becoming. Heathcliff 
returned as a man who was independent, certainly, but most of all he re-
turned as someone powerful—powerful enough to place himself beyond 
the injustice and pain inflicted on him by those who had delighted in 
mistreating him when he was young.5
Most significant of all, Heathcliff generated the energy and the means 
for his rise to power—somehow—out of his own internal resources. For 
neither Heathcliff nor me was there a deus ex machina in the form of a 
king, God, Saint George, a magistrate, or the Cheeryble brothers to help 
us out or to right our wrongs. But Heathcliff, unlike me, tapped sources 
of internal power and righted his wrongs for himself, a spectacle that 
was for me highly charged. I took care (unconsciously) not to identify 
with these feelings with any precision, for I had good reason to know 
in my relations with my father, as Heathcliff knew in his relations with 
Hindley, that it was dangerous to reveal either verbal or physical signs of 
rebellion. But underneath—in those murky regions of the human heart 
where nascent intentions are often disguised by the smoke of passion—
Heathcliff ’s ethic of power fed my rising spirit of rebellion.
Reading Wuthering Heights this way meant that there were many 
facets of Heathcliff ’s ethical character that I simply failed to take into ac-
count: that Heathcliff uses his power not merely to protect himself from 
others’ abuse but to seek revenge (and to seek it in out-of-scale ways); 
that Heathcliff shows profound disrespect for others by his willingness to 
use them as tools; that Heathcliff takes out his spite on innocent creatures 
like Isabella’s spaniel, whom he hangs, and on Catherine Linton, who is 
not entirely innocent but who has never wronged Heathcliff in any way 
that merits the hatred he bears her; that Heathcliff cruelly enjoys inflict-
ing pain; that Heathcliff is willing to sacrifice (by force) others’ happi-
ness, not to mention their very well-being, to serve his avarice; and that 
Heathcliff is not just deficient in charity but devoid of charity (as well as 
fellow-feeling, generosity, civility, and compassion) not only toward any-
one who ever wronged him, not only toward anyone who is innocently 
associated with anyone who ever wronged him, but to some people who 
have never wronged him, such as Lockwood.
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The abused, deprived, and needy frame of mind in which I read 
Wuthering Heights when I was fifteen prevented me from seeing these 
facts in their proper light. I hurried over these uncomfortable facts and 
squeezed them into the background of my attention. Because I was so 
tightly riveted to the spectacle of Heathcliff ’s rise to power, I failed to 
see the totality of his character, even though the data about Heathcliff ’s 
character is clearly laid out in the text. In trying to save Isabella from cer-
tain misery in forming an attachment to Heathcliff, Catherine Earnshaw 
says clearly—and as the only person who loves Heathcliff, her condem-
nation carries both veracity and force—that Isabella must not “imagine 
that [Heathcliff] conceals depths of benevolence and affection beneath a 
stern exterior! He’s not a rough diamond . . . he’s a fierce, pitiless, wolfish 
man” (89–90). On the other hand, it is a curious feature of the ethical vi-
sion of this novel as mediated by a skillful narrative technique that I and 
all other readers of Wuthering Heights are invited, despite the explicitness 
of Catherine’s characterization and Heathcliff ’s own actions, to make, if 
not an incomplete assessment of Heathcliff ’s character, as I did, then a 
more ethically benign assessment than the novel’s own evidence, viewed 
merely as data, calls for.
Brontë skillfully pulls off this interesting, ethical sleight-of-hand 
primarily by employing two storytelling strategies that nearly always 
work when an author or movie or TV director wants to cement her au-
dience’s sympathy for a character of dubious ethical nature. First, just 
as Thackeray makes us sympathize with Becky Sharp during the first 
half of Vanity Fair (1848), despite giving us plenty of evidence of her 
heartlessness—by showing Becky as comparatively better (in an ethical 
sense) than those around her or at least as no worse (and a whole lot 
more entertaining)—Brontë works for the same kind of amelioration 
of judgment by surrounding Heathcliff with people who, especially in 
his youth, are clearly just as fierce, wolfish, and pitiless, if not more so, 
than Heathcliff himself, and who have physical power over Heathcliff 
that they exploit to Heathcliff ’s disadvantage and pain. Second, in his 
youth, Heathcliff ’s physical courage and his attachment to Catherine 
give him a better-seeming character, comparatively, than those around 
him. Third, Brontë coerces leniency of judgment from her audience to-
ward Heathcliff, as authors and storytellers have been doing forever, by 
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showing him wrongfully abused, a technique that is especially effective if 
the abused character is a child. If all of the different kinds of evidence for 
and against Heathcliff ’s character are given full consideration, no careful 
reader could conclude that Wuthering Heights fails to give him or her 
all the data needed for seeing the wolfish and pitiless character whom 
 Catherine accurately describes, but the strategies I have just cataloged 
also invite readers, even careful ones, to lean sympathetically in Heath-
cliff ’s direction and allow Brontë to have her narrative cake and eat it too. 
As a youthful reader I was wrong to focus so narrowly on Heathcliff ’s 
rise to power—wrong for letting the lens of my life obscure my clear 
view of the novel’s own data—but Emily Brontë plays a calculating game 
as narrator in making such a misreading easier for me (and for any other 
reader as well) than if she had given her readers the ethical skinny about 
Heathcliff ’s character in a more straightforward manner.
But of course Brontë is right to tell her story in her own way. She’s a 
novelist, not my moral babysitter, and as long as she doesn’t deliberately 
contradict the terms of her own representation, which she doesn’t, what 
she achieves by means of her novel’s ethical vision of complex rights and 
wrongs is a layered portrayal of the multidimensional context in which 
ethical character emerges and in which ethical judgments are generated. 
She shows clearly that the interplay between ethical character and ethical 
judgments is messy, complicated, always susceptible to corruption from 
the play of self-interest, and highly prone to error because of human be-
ings’ limited ability to draw correct ethical inferences from others’ con-
crete conduct. But she also shows equally clearly that nothing is more 
important than sustaining an energetic effort, despite its difficulties, to 
get it right: to understand what ethical character is and to see clearly the 
criteria by which to judge it.
My College Reading of Wuthering Heights:  
Embarrassing Credulity about Nelly
When in my third year of college I read Wuthering Heights for the second 
time, my increased skills of analytical reading led me to see Heathcliff ’s 
villainy of character more clearly than I had before. The more I thought 
about Heathcliff in this new light, the more it became apparent to me that 
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Heathcliff did not represent the kind of power I wanted for fending off 
my father’s injustices. Now I saw Heathcliff ’s wolfish pitilessness as just 
another version of my father. Since even in my abused youth I longed for 
power primarily as a means of self-protection, not self-aggrandizement, 
my now clearer view of Heathcliff ’s villainy led me as a reader to a highly 
uncritical acceptance of the only person in the novel, Nelly Dean, who 
persistently articulates explicit judgments against Heathcliff ’s charac-
ter. As a college reader I was still allowing the dynamics of my troubled 
 family relations to guide my reading of Wuthering Heights in ways that 
 continued to obscure my understanding. What I failed to see on this 
 second reading, of course, was all the evidence that Nelly Dean is often an 
unreliable narrator and is always a self-serving narrator. As I attempted 
in my college reading to correct my high school fascination with Heath-
cliff ’s power by now distancing myself from his villainy, I used Nelly’s 
platitudinous judgments as my means of doing so.
I cringe to admit that Nelly’s platitudes became my platitudes. When 
Nelly smugly tells readers that “I went about my household duties, con-
vinced that the Grange had but one sensible soul in its walls, and that 
lodged in my body” (103), my too-credulous college-reader self (mea 
culpa!) believed her. And when she responds with a pious cliché to one 
of young Heathcliff ’s many angry claims that he will one day work his 
revenge on Hindley—“ ‘For shame, Heathcliff !,’ said I. ‘It is for God to 
punish wicked people; we should learn to forgive’ ” (57)—I took her to 
be prescribing civilized and sensible medicine for the cure of Heathcliff ’s 
bitterness. On the face of it this is what Nelly is doing, of course, but pre-
scribing generic medicine that fails to take the patient’s circumstances 
into realistic account is not actually a help. It’s just moralizing for the 
sake of moralizing.
But there are instances when Nelly’s judgments are sufficiently 
shrewd, insightful, and ethically satisfying that inattentive or inexperi-
enced readers such as I was in college can be lulled into lowering their 
critical guard and taking everything else that Nelly says at face value, in-
cluding her sentimental elevation of all the novel’s “nice” characters and 
her exaggerated depreciation of the “not nice” characters. Inattentive 
readers can also be led to accept the persistently self-serving commentary 
that Nelly uses to justify her control over the flow of domestic informa-
tion in her employers’ homes. Acting as a kind of information gatekeeper, 
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Nelly sometimes deletes information, sometimes alters it, almost always 
spins it, and sometimes just makes it up. But despite these questionable 
ethical practices—questionable on the ethical fronts of honesty, respect, 
integrity, compassion, and sometimes just plain kindness—Nelly buys a 
vast deal of credit for herself with the few arrows of criticism that fly dead 
center to her target, as when she deftly delivers a slitty-eyed rejoinder to 
Catherine’s complaint that she is always having to baby Edgar’s and Isa-
bella’s feelings. Nelly shoots back, “ ‘You’re mistaken,’ Mrs. Linton,’ said I. 
‘They humor you. . . . You can well afford to indulge their passing whims, 
as long as their business is to anticipate all your desires’ ” (86). Readers 
who delight in the dead-on accuracy of this insight, and a few others that 
Brontë strategically salts throughout her tale, are tempted to view all other 
insights by Nelly as having equal authority. The only problem is, they don’t 
all have equal authority. I simply failed to see this fact in my college-level 
reading of Wuthering Heights.
My Grad School Reading of Wuthering Heights:  
Whiplash Judgments about Nelly
When I reread Wuthering Heights in graduate school at the University 
of Chicago, however, I nearly gave myself intellectual whiplash from the 
force of my rebound interpretation of Nelly Dean’s status as an ethical 
judge and social commentator. Having developed my reading skills ex-
ponentially since college, and having just read Wayne Booth’s The Rheto-
ric of Fiction, as well as having taken classes in literary criticism from 
Booth, Ronald Crane, and Elder Olson, I walked to the batter’s box on 
my next rereading of Wuthering Heights fully prepared not to swing at 
any sucker pitches. Nelly Dean, stuck with her script, naturally, threw all 
of the same explanations and judgments that had sailed right by me in 
earlier years like those low inside pitches that hitters who like high out-
side balls never see. Now, however, armed with all kinds of major league 
skills for hitting spitball pitchers who try to slide platitudinous, unreli-
able curve balls over my narrative plate, I knocked poor Nelly off the 
pitching mound by line-driving all her meddling, dishonest, trimmed, 
shaved, and trumped-up information right back at her.6
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As you can doubtless infer from my batting metaphors, I certainly 
felt intellectually virtuous and highly professional in having learned how 
to do this sort of reading, and now I had an even greater problem with 
Wuthering Heights’ ethical vision than I did with Nelly Dean as narra-
tor. I especially disliked what I perceived—and continue to perceive—as 
the novel’s championing of an ethical vision that favors undisciplined, 
rampant Romanticism: a configuration of rights and wrongs that asks 
readers to admire intensity of feeling for its own sake, no matter how 
self-indulgent or irrational or harmful, and that asks readers to be fasci-
nated with near-mad emotionalism, as if such emotional extremity con-
stitutes an obviously higher mode of existence than everyday soberness 
and judicious thought.
Wuthering Heights honors not just fiercely intense emotions but 
fiercely intense emotionalism, a state of being in which one is addicted 
to extreme feelings in the same way that Duke Orsino is a man addicted 
to being in love with love. This kind of emotionalism for its own sake 
was all too similar to the anti-intellectual emotionalism of the Protes-
tant fundamentalism I had been raised in, and I knew all too well how 
easily it could mask limitless forms of self-aggrandizement, selfishness, 
and cruelty. When Heathcliff makes histrionic utterances such as “The 
moment [Catherine’s] regard ceased [for Linton], I would have torn his 
heart out, and drank his blood!” or “[Linton] couldn’t love as much in 
eighty years as I could in a day” (125–26), I’m convinced that Brontë 
wants all of her readers to feel that the energy, the vigor, the masculine 
power, and the brutal assertion of self-interest so honestly portrayed is 
a good thing—or at least a good thing in comparison with the mealy-
mouthed piety of Linton. Heathcliff ’s contempt for Linton seems to be 
Brontë’s contempt as well, the product of an ethical vision all aswoon 
over Romantic intensity.
The novel’s over-the-top melodrama ethically repelled me even in my 
graduate school days. Catherine’s violent response to Edgar’s anger about 
Heathcliff is a good example: “There she lay dashing her head against 
the arm of the sofa, and grinding her teeth, so that you might fancy she 
would crash them to splinters!” “Good,” was my reaction, “I hope she 
hits wood and knocks some sense into her head.” I was even unhappier 
with the novel’s rip-off of Ophelia’s mad scene in which she distributes 
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the flowers to the Elsinore courtiers7 and the later rip-off of Keats’s “Ode 
to a Nightingale.”8 If I had thought that Brontë was using these rip-offs 
to satirize excessive and irrational emotionalism, I might have appreci-
ated their deft appropriateness in revealing Catherine’s character, but it 
seemed to me then—and still seems to me now—that Brontë uses these 
rip-offs not to satirize the characters but to show that despite their social 
and psychological pathologies they enjoy a more intense and therefore 
superior kind of existence to that of everyone else.
Nothing separates the ethical vision of Brontë’s ersatz, immature Ro-
manticism from the ethical vision of mature Romanticism better than a 
contrast with the near ending of Keats’s “Ode to a Nightingale,” which 
is also a literary representation about escaping bodily constraints and 
living in some golden realm where bodies do not shatter and feelings 
do not shred. But Keats, unlike Brontë, is enough of a hardheaded real-
ist to accept facts rather than indulge in fantasies. “The fancy cannot 
cheat so well,” he admits. The fancy, in other words, cannot provide real 
escape from the built-in conditions of human existence. In the end, the 
bird’s song, which throughout the poem has symbolized a transcendent 
avenue of escape from the mundane, simply goes away—“Adieu! adieu! 
thy plaintive anthem fades”—leaving human beings positioned where 
they are always positioned: negotiating their existence in the context of 
a thousand competing desires and conditions, but never escaping their 
muddled, mixed state as creatures of innumerable contraries.
If an ethical vision either in a narrative or in a life serves any concrete 
end at all, it provides the resources for making or not making the kind 
of call that Brontë’s ethical vision avoids and that Keats’s ethical vision 
embraces. Brontë seems intent on ordering the rights and wrongs of her 
fictional world in such a way that, at least for Heathcliff and Catherine, es-
cape really is possible. In the end, Brontë tries to pass off this bogus notion 
to her readers, initially through Lockwood’s vision of Catherine’s ghost at 
the beginning of the novel, and subsequently through Heathcliff ’s visions 
of that same ghost as he becomes more and more distractedly entangled 
with it, such that he can neither eat nor sleep, until he dies, at which point 
he and Catherine are joined together, presumably, forever.
Yawn. This is an ethic of escapism, not an ethic of generosity or 
kindness or self-control or honesty or compassion. In short, it is not an 
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ethic that has anything to do with ethics as principles to which we might 
appeal for assistance in living a deliberate life in which, at the very least, 
we do no harm, or a life in which, at the most, we might actually make 
life for us and our companions better than it would otherwise be. This is 
a humble enough ethical vision, to be sure—there’s nothing grandly he-
roic about doing no harm or trying to create the conditions in everyday 
life that encourage human flourishing—but who can deny that an ethical 
vision based on honesty, justice, kindness, self-control, generosity, com-
passion, and the capacity to feel shame when we have done wrong would 
make the world more hospitable to human happiness than the ethic of 
Wuthering Heights, an ethic that honors the selfish assertion of fiercely 
intense emotionalism above all other ethical qualities.
Rereading Wuthering Heights After Thirty Years:  
Coming to Terms
But perhaps Brontë is more subtle than I have just described her to be. 
Perhaps she is not simply out to honor the selfish assertion of fiercely in-
tense emotionalism but, in fact, after larger, different, and more interesting 
game.9 An alternative way of understanding the ethical vision of Wuther-
ing Heights is to see it as a critique of middle-class power, middle-class 
niceties, middle-class sentimentality, and, above all, middle-class hypoc-
risy. Viewed in this way, the ethical vision of Wuthering Heights positions 
Thrushcross Grange as a kind of miniature kingdom dominated by middle-
class values, and existing in direct opposition to Wuthering Heights as a 
kind of miniature kingdom dominated by anti–middle-class values.
From this perspective, both kingdoms are places where power mat-
ters most but where the typical power of each kingdom manifests itself in 
radically different ways. The power at Thrushcross Grange is socially legiti-
mate, historically traditional, and massively patriarchal—God the father 
above all, King the “sire” above all subjects, men above women, husbands 
above wives, fathers above children, masters above servants—and is ac-
companied by all the behaviors that traditionally identify and reinforce 
middle-class power: going to church, getting educated, observing pro-
prieties, paying lip service to the pieties, using a refined accent, dressing 
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like other middle-class persons, observing traditional gender roles, and, 
above all, sticking with class peers in all matters of tension, competition, 
or trouble between middle-class persons and the lower orders, especially 
about matters of sexual tension in which persons threaten to blur class 
lines by falling in love and getting married across class boundaries.
This is a more interesting hypothesis about the ethical vision at the 
center of Wuthering Heights than my earlier hypothesis about rampant 
Romanticism because it makes Brontë’s ethical vision in support of the 
intense emotionalism at Wuthering Heights a means to an end, not an 
end in itself. From this perspective, Brontë’s ethical vision is designed 
to make us see the corrupt ethics of middle-class power—typified by 
the configuration of rights and wrongs in the kingdom of Thrushcross 
Grange—for what it really is. Its end, in other words, is to expose a kind 
of velvet-hammer middle-class oppression, and its means is to show 
us what that oppression looks and sounds like when it drops the velvet 
hammer and picks us the ax and pitchfork, when oppressiveness asserts 
itself in the most raw, selfish, callous, undisciplined, unguarded, unfeel-
ing, and unkind ways possible, which are the ways that it typically ex-
presses itself in the kingdom of Wuthering Heights.
Throughout her novel Brontë exerts persistent pressure on middle-
class ideals and values. She keeps smashing at them the way Heathcliff 
smashes at the windows and locks of Thrushcross Grange, and Heathcliff 
and Catherine are her main smashing tools. Of Isabella, whose love for 
Heathcliff seems based on a middle-class archetype of the blunt-man-
with-a-gruff-exterior-who-turns-out-to-be-honorable-and-loving-
 underneath-the-surface, Heathcliff says, once Isabella’s eyes are opened 
to reality, “I don’t care who knows that the passion was wholly on one 
side, and I never told her a lie about it. She cannot accuse me of showing 
one little bit of deceitful softness” (127). His speech of contempt about 
Linton’s love for Catherine is even more explicit in its attack on middle-
class notions of decency, decorum, and rightness: “And that insipid, pal-
try creature attending [Catherine] from duty and humanity! From pity 
and charity! [Edgar] might as well plant an oak in a flowerpot, and ex-
pect it to thrive, as imagine he can restore [Catherine] to vigor in the soil 
of his shallow cares!” (129; emphasis in original).
There’s no middle-class gallantry here, and no middle-class nice-
ness, but there is an honesty of contempt. Surely Brontë is right to sug-
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gest that contempt is also present in many middle-class relations, only in 
those relations contempt is masked by middle-class charms, conventions, 
and well-bred smiles. If this is what Brontë hates, she does a good job 
of showing what its real nature looks like once its middle-class garb is 
removed and it stands naked before us in all of its self-interested ugli-
ness. But if Brontë wants readers to infer that honestly expressed oppres-
sion is to be preferred, especially on ethical grounds, over middle-class 
hypocritical oppression, I can only say to her, “ask the victims whether 
it really matters or not.” The distinction between middle-class modes of 
hypocritical oppression and honestly raw self-interested oppression is a 
nicety unimportant to victims.
An ethical vision that only tears down what we hate cannot help us 
build up what we love. If Thrushcross Grange represents middle-class 
values and conduct and Wuthering Heights represents anti–middle-class 
values and conduct, what this ethical vision seems unable to comprehend 
is that an anti–middle-class ideology is not a program for living—or, if 
Brontë does comprehend it, she seems to have boxed herself in with a 
story that cannot go beyond it. The ethical vision of Wuthering Heights 
expresses objections to human diminishment but includes no theory of 
human flourishing. If Brontë thinks, as she apparently does, that an anti–
middle-class ideology can be substituted for a positive theory of life, then 
perhaps she has not departed very far, after all, from the Romantic es-
capism I earlier accused her of indulging in. Having used Catherine and 
Heathcliff to critique middle-class hypocrisy, but having no view of how 
they might actually construct a positive life together in the mundane 
realm, the best that Brontë seems to be able to offer them is that bogus 
life-after-death, which posits that they live for the remainder of eternity 
wandering the moors together as ghosts.
Ethical Vision and Human Flourishing
Is it fair to hold Brontë, or any other storyteller, to the criterion of ad-
vancing an ethical vision that includes “a theory of human flourishing”? 
Certainly not—not in any abstract, absolute, deductive sense. But it is 
certainly not unfair to point out in an inductive way that this story or that 
story does not include such an ethical vision—and that David Copperfield 
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clearly does.10 I have no desire to position Emily Brontë at some precise 
spot on a bogus continuum that runs from “lesser” storytellers up to 
“greater” storytellers. But it is legitimate for me to bare the grounds of 
my prejudice in favor of stories that have theories, so to speak, over those 
that merely have objections.
This means that, for me at least, I feel a profounder resonance with 
stories that include an ethical vision of how life might be put together 
than with stories whose ethical visions limit themselves merely to attack-
ing the failures of some other ethical vision. There were lots of things in 
Dickens’s world that he objected to—and few writers could voice their 
objections with the same rhetorical force as Dickens—but Dickens’s ethi-
cal vision that in a single stroke bound my heart to his works in graduate 
school, and that still binds me to them today, is not just his objections to 
Murdstone’s cruelty, Steerforth’s selfishness, and Uriah Heep’s meanness, 
but his positive theory about the kinds of human relations that make 
everyday life—the place where we all really live—not just bearable but 
joyful and productive.
Dickens, like Keats, ultimately tries to be a realist. He is certainly 
unrealistic in some ways, most notably in his limited understanding of 
romantic relations between young men and women, but his grasp of such 
ethical principles as justice, kindness, honesty, compassion, and the capacity 
for shame is both strong and sure. Dickens knows goodness versus op-
pression and compassion versus cruelty when he sees them, but he never 
longs for a transcendent realm of bogus escape. His ethical vision asserts 
powerfully that the quality of people’s lives is created not by the ideologies 
they applaud in the abstract, but by the ethical choices they make in the 
concrete world of everyday social interactions at business, in the street, 
at table, and when people need help or are called upon to give help. And 
he knows how to contrast nourishing and productive ethical choices with 
those that are demeaning, destructive, selfish, cruel, and self-interested.
As Dickens’s novels show and as Wuthering Heights does not, we 
 really can live better lives if we shape them in accordance to an ethical 
vision that encourages us to live up to everyday standards of decency, 
honesty, justice, and compassion. The economic system of energy and 
values that Brontë depicts in Wuthering Heights, however, suggests that 
life is too compressed, too thin, and too competitive ever to provide the 
Ethical Engagements Over Time 165
resources for human flourishing. Once old Earnshaw brings Heathcliff 
home, there isn’t enough love to go around any more. Hindley and Cathy 
are placed outside the orbit of the old man’s concern. No matter where 
we turn in this novel we see insufficiencies. Even the cold stone floors 
and drafty windows and dark walls repel all approaches of human soft-
ness and warmth. There is especially an insufficiency of primitive ethical 
virtues and resources—concern, compassion, kindness, justice—such 
that everyone at Wuthering Heights grows up not only cold and lonely 
but stunted, deprived, manipulated, manipulative, and misshapen.
In everyday life these kinds of consequences are not determined by 
the huge abstractions that we like to blame for them (which has the dubi-
ous benefit of letting us off the moral hook for other people’s unhappi-
ness and pain), abstractions such as the “forces of history” or “economic 
laws” or “the depravity of humankind.” In everyday life, our failures of 
ethical responsibility and sensitivity are created or avoided not by these 
huge abstractions, but by the day-by-day, moment-by-moment choices 
we make in our social and ethical relations with other people. Dickens 
sees this. He knows that any attempt to see Murdstone as merely the 
product of original sin, or as a product of the pressures of a commer-
cial society, or as a product of misguided Puritanism misses the fact that 
Murdstone could have behaved differently if he had been possessed of a 
different ethical vision of life, one that is clearly available to him because 
other people who are equally vulnerable to original sin and the pres-
sures of a commercial society and misguided Puritanism do not behave 
as Murdstone behaves.
In analyzing the origin of pathologies in either fictional or real-life 
persons, we may talk the language of politics, power, ethnicity, gender, 
race, class, economics, nationalism, tradition, custom, mores, and so on. 
All of this talk is highly relevant to an understanding of our circum-
stances as embodied, historically situated agents. I am not claiming that 
ethical visions are not embodied and historically situated—they are—but 
I am claiming that ethical visions are not so much the products of his-
tory and culture as they are the elemental human orientations that make 
culture and history possible.11
Dickens’s ethical vision taps into rock-bottom human orientations. 
His vision is simple but goes deep, and for this reason I will always hold 
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Dickens’s works more closely to my heart than Brontë’s works, though I 
want to emphasize that the point of ethical criticism is not to rank nov-
elists and their novels on some simple scale, but to engage in complex 
ways with the ethical visions they offer. In this regard, I have found many 
rewards over a forty-year period of reading and rereading Wuthering 
Heights because the struggle I have had in weighing its values over time 
has taught me to think productively about the very ideas I have discussed 
in this chapter. I could never have written this chapter without the edu-
cation I have acquired in my rereadings of Wuthering Heights. I value the 
instructiveness of this engagement almost as much as I value the ways in 
which David Copperfield has been a touchstone for me.
For all of us, a lifetime of engagements with the ethical visions of 
stories becomes a major component in the construction of our ethical 
vision of life. Engaging with new stories and reencountering old ones 
generate a dynamic composed of both energy and matter, desire and 
substance. The actions, attitudes, and judgments we see in stories be-
come the actions, attitudes, and judgments we put together in life, and 
these, cumulatively considered, turn us into persons we become. Surely 
this not only explains but justifies a deep concern to understand, com-
pare, and evaluate stories’ ethical visions. We weave together the stories 
in our life into a pattern that ultimately becomes the story of our life. 
Learning to understand, compare, and evaluate stories’ ethical visions 
becomes a way to understand ourselves: not only who we are and what 
we want, but who we ought to be and what we should want.
